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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 
15788 
DUNG HUNG VO I 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged on two counts with violations 
of§ 78-3a-19, u.c.A., 1953asar.ended,inthat he willfully, 
intentionally and unlawfully harbored a runaway minor and 
did thereby cause that minor to become delinquent. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The defendant was tried without a jury before 
the Honorable Merrill Hermansen in the Third District 
Juvenile Court for Utah County, State of Utah on one count 
and was found guilty as charged on the 17th day of April, 
l978. The defendant plead guilty to the other count. He 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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was then sentenced to 90 days in the Utah County Jail under 
a work-release program and a fine of $150.00 on each cou~ 
or $300.00 in total. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the lower court's 
verdict and sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Becky Horton, a juvenile (R.5), ran away from 
home on September 19, 19 77. She went from Provo to Springvi: 
to visit several friends and then travelled back to Provo~ 
proceeded to appellant's apartment where she found a friend 
named Cindy Graves (R.6-8). The appellant, a Vietnamese 
alien with limited English language ability, arrived three 
or four hours later and greeted the girls by saying "hi" (L: 
Both girls stayed at the apartment that night (R.11). 
The next day Becky left the apartment for awhile 
to visit with her boyfriend (R.11) and when she returned, 
her friend Cindy was gone (R.14). That evening, when the 
appellant returned, he questioned Becky as to what she had 
told her boyfriend and why she had run away from home (R.2J,. 
He also told Becky that he had moved Cindy so that if one of 
them got caught, the other would not (R.17). Becky also 
testified that she was never made to feel uncomfortable in 
the apartment by the appellant (R. 24) although sexual advancr 
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were made tm,1ards her by two other Vietnamese males in the 
apartment when the appellant was not present (R.19, 20). 
That night, Becky slept in the appellant's bedroom while 
he moved into the other bedroom (R.18 and 30). 
During the third day, Becky's father and the 
police arrived at the apartment and found Becky hiding in 
a bathroom closet (R.24 and 33). 
POINT I 
THE CHARGES BROUGHT AGAINST THE APPELLANT ALLOWED 
A CONVICTION UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF EITHER OF TWO 
ALTERNATIVE SETS OF ELEMENTS. 
Although the appellant was charged with a violation 
of § 78-3a-19, U.C.A. as amended 1953, (T.2, 3) the various 
subsections of that statute indicate alternative categories 
of adults who may be tried by the juvenile courts for offenses 
committed against children. These subsections, therefore, 
provide alternative routes by which a defendant may be 
convicted. The actions of the appellant are proscribed by 
either subsection (1), 
"Any person eighteen years of age 
or over who induces, aids, or encourages 
a child to violate any federal, state, 
or local law or municipal ordinance, or 
who tends to cause children to become or 
remain delinquent, or who aids, contributes 
to or becomes responsible for the neglect 
or delinquency of any child;" 
or subsection ( 3) , 
-3-
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"Any person eighteen years or over 
who forcibly takes away a child from, or 
encourages him to leave, the legal or 
physical custody of any person, agency, 
or institution in which the child has 
been legally placed for the purpose of 
care, support, education, or adoption, 
or any person who knowingly detains or 
harbors such child." [Emphasis added.] 
In the instant case, the pertinent elements under 
subsection (1) are that the defendant; 
1. must be over age eighteen and 
2. induce, aid, or encourage a child to violate 
the law or tend to cause children to become 
or remain delinquent or aid, contribute to, 
or become responsible for the neglect or 
delinquency of an child; 
or, under subsection (3); that the defendant 
1. must be over eighteen and 
2. knowingly 
3. detain or harbor a child who has left the 
physical custody of those responsible for 
him or her. 
POINT II 
THE CORPUS DELICTI RULE IN THIS CASE SHOULD ONLY 
REQUIRE THAT THE STATE PROVE THE INJURY SPECIFIED IN THE 
STATUTE OCCURRED AND THAT IT WAS CAUSED BY THE ACT OF so~ 
PERSON. 
-4-
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Some of the most damaging evidence with respect 
to appellant's position in the lower court came out through 
either re-statements of admissions made by the defendant 
to a witness or through direct statements of the 
appellant during the trial. (See Memorandum of Findings 
and Order, finding of fact No. 4 and R.17.) Appellant 
contends that the corpus delicti rule requires that proof 
of his involvement in a crime must be introduced before 
the court may consider any admissions of the appellant 
himself. 1 Utah precedent and other authority, however, 
would indicate that the rule is not nearly so broad. 
1 It should be noted, at this point, that appellant 
claims as error only the introduction of Becky Horton's 
testimony to the effect that the appellant told her that 
he was splitting her and her friend up so that both would 
not be caught at the same time. Additional evidence was 
presented through Miss Horton's testimony which demonstrates 
the same knowledge element as will be discussed below. 
Respondent feels obligated, however, in spite of 
appellant's concession on pages 8 and 9 of his brief 
that the State had proven the age element to note that 
the appellant's majority was not establishad via evidence 
independent from the appellant's own admissions. It is 
the respondent's contention, however, that neither proof 
of knowledge nor appellant's majority is a required portion 
of the corpus delicti in this case, even though they are 
clearly elements of the crime, as noted above. 
-5-
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The corpus delicti rule is stated in State v. 
Knoefler, 563 P.2d 175 (Utah, 1977). 
"An admission or a confession, 
without some independent corroborative 
evidence of the corpus delicti, cannot 
alone support a guilty verdict. To 
sustain a conviction, the requirement 
of independent proof of the corpus 
delicti requires only that the State 
present evidence that the injury 
specified in the crime occurred, and 
that such injury was caused by some-
one's criminal conduct." 
Wharton's Criminal Evidence, however, points out that: 
"For the preliminary purpose of 
determining whether an extrajudicial 
confession or admission is to be 
allowed in evidence--or, putting it 
another way, whether the corroboration 
of an extrajudicial confession or 
admission sufficient to support a 
conviction is present, there must be 
proof of the corpus delicti not beyond 
a reasonable doubt, but rather the 
evidence adduced need only tend to 
show consistency with unlawfulness in 
causing the injury in question." Charles 
E. Torcia, wnarton Is Criminal Evidence, 
13th Edition, Vol. I, § 17, p. 28. 
Thus, the State does not have to prove the entire case beyor 
a reasonable doubt before admitting any of the defendant's 
admissions, but rather need only introduce evidence demon-
strating the corpus delicti. 
Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Edition, § 2072 further 
explaines the purpose and extent of the corpus delicti 
rule: 
-6-
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.it warns us to be cautious 
in convicting, since it may subsequently 
appear that no one has sustained any loss 
at all; for example, a man has disappeared, 
but perhaps he may later re-appear alive." 
(u.t p. 401.) 
Wigmore then goes on to note that "to find that he is in truth 
dead, yet not by criminal violence ..• is not the discovery 
against which the rule is designed to warn and protect us." 
(at p. 401.) 
In State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 158 A.2d 11 (1960), 
a felony murder conviction, the court held that: 
"The State was not required to 
prove, independently of the defendants' 
confessions, the fact that the shooting 
occurred during the commission of a felony. 
Of the three elements of murder, i.e. death, 
criminal agency and the connection of the 
defendants therewith, the State need in-
dependently prove only the first." (at p. 19.) 
See also State v. Tillman, 152 Conn. 15, 202 A.2d 494 (1964). 
This reasoning is especially applicable in the instant 
case. Miss Horton testified that she had run away and was 
allowed to hide within appellant's apartment (R.6-8,11,13). This 
is the harm against which the statute under which the appellant 
was convicted is designed to protect. Whether or not this harm 
came about as a result of criminal conduct is not determined, 
in this case, by the nature of the acts of the appellant, but 
rather by the nature of the appellant himself. The harm 
to the minor, consisting of being helped to become or remain 
-7-
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delinquent or of having been harbored and therefore aided 
in remaining without the lawful and legal supervision and 
care of her parents, would have occurred whether the appel]o 
had been 16 or 32, given the same conduct on the part of 
the appellant. The State had demonstrated, before the 
testimony of appellant as to his age or the testimony of 
the police officer concerning appellant's admission of his 
age, that the harm or injury had occurred. This should 
satisfy the requirements of the corpus delicti rule in this 
case. 
In addition, the court should take note of 
several other unusual aspects of this case. The appellant 
is a Vietnamese alien. As a result, foreign records as to 
his birth are very difficult, if not impossible to obtain 
from his homeland. While the Federal Department of 
Immigration and Naturalization may have some documents 
similar to a birth certificate, they often do not and 
their records contain, in many cases, nothing more than 
admissions of immigrants as to their age. Therefore, in 
cases such as this, to require independent proof of a 
defendant's age, when such proof may sim?lY not be avililabli, 
could seriously hamper the processes of criminal justice 
within the state. 
Another important point is that the appellant 
had, only a few months prior to this trial, been charged 
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with a violation of this same statute before the same trial 
judge. (Note that there are two counts involved, appellant 
plead guilty to one and appealed a conviction on the other.) 
It was known to all participants that in spite of the lack 
of independent evidence as to the appellant's age, he was 
of majority. Although defense counsel refused to stipulate 
to his client's age, he does not challenge on appeal the 
court's conclusion that appellant was over 18 years of age. 
The State argues that the corpus delicti rule was 
satisfied and that the conviction below should be upheld. 
POINT III 
THE REM.~INING ELEMENTS UNDER EITHER CONVICTION 
ALTEENATIVE WERE ESTABLISHED BY THE STATE. 
Although Utah does not have a statutory definition 
of "delinquency" or of "contributing to the delinquency", 
The Supreme Court has stated, in State v. Tritt, 23 U.2d 
365, 463 P.2d 806 (1970) that: 
"The terms 'delinquency' and 
'contributing to the delinquency' as 
applied to minors has for many decades 
had such a widespread usage as to give 
clear and understandable ~eaning that 
it denotes actions that will aid, en-
courage or involve children in conduct 
which is contrary to law, or which is 
so contrary to the generally accepted 
standards of decency and morality that 
its result will be substantially harmful 
to the mental, moral or physical well-
being of the child." (at 808, 809.) 
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A child who has run away from home involves conduct which 
could likely result in harm to the moral, if not physical 
or mental well-being of the child. In any event, to 
foster and encourage a child's separation from his or her 
home and parents through the provision of shelter and aid 
in avoiding detection would certainly come within the above 
definition of "contributing to the- delinquency" of a minor. 
Although it is true, as appellant points out in 
his brief on page 7, that the Juvenile Court may take 
jurisdiction of a runaway child upon referral from the 
Division of Family Services, whether or not that child can 
be considered "delinquent" for the purposes of the prosecutii 
of an adult under§ 78-3a-19, U.C.A., 1953 as amended, is~ 
determined by that fact. In other words, it has been 
determined, in this state, that a child may become delinquen: 
without committing any specific crimes and that encouragemen: 
or aid to commit a crime is not a necessary element of 
contributing to a child's delinquency. See State v. Tritt, 
supra. 
In the instant case, Becky Horton, a minor, had 
left her parent's home without permission and was hiding f« 
her parents and the police when she was found (R. 3la). Even 
though she was never encouraged or asked to commit any speci' 
crimes, she was delinquent and any help given to her in her 
attempts to evade her parents and the police constitutes a 
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contribution to her delinquency. Thus, the remaining element 
under subsection (1) was established. 
Subsection (3) requires that the defendant knowingly 
harbor a runaway minor. 
While it is not clear whether or not the appellant 
knew that Becky Horton was a runaway minor when he first 
found her in his apartment, the fact that he asked her 
why she had run away on the second night clearly indicates 
that he knew that she was a runaway (R. 28, 29). 
Appellant cites State v. Macri, 28 U.2d 69, 498 
P.2d 355 (1972) to demonstrate that the simple act of providing 
shelter to a runaway does not constitute "harboring" under 
§ 78-3a-19(3). That case can be distinguished from the present 
case and is not determinative here. 
In Macri, the appellant was operating an institution 
whose prime purpose was to help alienated youth and people 
involved with drug problems. The minor involved in that 
prosecution was one of many youths from many different areas 
staying at that appellant's church. The minor and her friend 
in Macri also elected to return home and did so. Here, no 
particular positive function could be filled by Becky's 
staying with the appellant. There were never more than two 
girls in the apartment and, as evidenced by the sexual 
advances made by other residents of the apartment, the 
-11-
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apartment was hardly a place where Becky's problems could 
have been helped. Becky did not elect to return home, but 
instead, hid when the police and her father came looking for 
her. The facts are therefore distinguishable and although 
the conduct of the appellant in MacE.i:_ in providing shelter 
may not have been proscribed by the intent of the statute, 
the actions of the appellant here should be. 
Appellant also noted that no evidence as to the 
ownership of the apartment was introduced. He cited 
State v. Davis, 16 Wash. App. 657, 558 P.2d 263 (1977) to 
demonstrate the necessity of such proof. The case can also 
be factually distinguished in that while in that case the 
defendant was merely found to be asleep in the same house, 
the appellant here clearly moved out of his own bedroom to 
allow Becky Horton and Cindy Graves a place to sleep. By 
acting as he did, the appellant in this case did knowingly 
harbor Becky Horton, a runaway minor. 
CONCLUSION 
By proceeding under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-19, 
1953 as amended, the State had the option of proving eith~ 
the elements of subsection (1) or subsection (3). Althollgh 
the only evidence clearly establishing the appellant's 
knowledge and majority was his own statement, the nature of 
the crime involved indicates that the State need not 
necessarily prove age or knowledge as parts of the corpus 
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delicti even though they are elements of the crime. All of 
the other elements of the crime were established via sufficient 
evidence. The State, therefore, urges the court to uphold 
the conviction and sentence of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
MICHAEL L. DEAMER 
Deputy Attorney General 
CRAIG L. BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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